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ABSTRACT 
The spiral of violence generated by the drug war in Mexico over the past decade has 
raised security concerns, not only in Mexico, but also in the international community. 
The rise of vigilante groups in Michoacán (operating at least in theory) against organized 
crime and violence related to drug trafficking has recently and dramatically drawn 
attention to the relative weakness of government institutions in some parts of Mexico. 
This has in turn led some commentators to continue to describe Mexico as a potential 
“failed state.” However, the term failed state overlooks the specific location and character 
of both organized crime and violence in those parts of Mexico where it has become a 
problem. It is argued here that an understanding of the vigilante groups in Michoacán in 
relation to the historical, social, political, cultural, and economic particularities of 
Michoacán can best be achieves by setting aside the notion of a failed state and using the 
idea of “ungoverned spaces.” Taking ungoverned spaces as its point of departure, this 
thesis argues that the high level of violence in the ungoverned spaces in Michoacán has 
resulted in a parallel system of governance in much of the state; however, this is not the 
same as a failed state. This thesis takes a fresh look at drug trafficking and violence 
related to drug trafficking that moves beyond broad notions of failed states and focuses 
on the specifics of ungoverned spaces in parts of Mexico and elsewhere that drug-
trafficking and violence in particular have generated considerable concern. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: FROM FAILED STATES TO 
UNGOVERNED SPACES 
This thesis will answer the question “Why did the autodefensas emerge, 
specifically in Michoacán, in 2013?” Early in that year, the emergence of the 
autodefensas in the state of Michoacán complicated the usual landscape of armed conflict 
in the region. The violence has always been a result of competition between rival 
criminal organizations. The rise of these groups reflects the social consequences of 
prolonged violence and the government’s inability to enforce the rule of law in 
historically rural regions that were, and are, difficult to control. The so-called “war on 
drugs” has contributed to the emergence of ungoverned spaces, spaces in which the state 
is not properly functioning. Furthermore, in some these spaces, control has transferred to 
organized crime, whether directly or indirectly. 
This thesis argues that the high level of violence in the ungoverned spaces in 
Michoacán has resulted in a parallel system of governance in much of the state; however, 
this is not the same as a failed state. Furthermore, there is no consensus on the proper 
definition of failed state, therefore I will offer a critique of the term to justify why this not 
apply to the Mexican case, taking “ungoverned spaces” as its point of departure. For 
example, some writers argue that the concept is unable to explain the fragmentation of 
the public power, the historical context, and the social disintegration as a source of 
ungovernability.1  
This chapter first lays out the research question and the definition of 
autodefensas, as well as ungoverned spaces that guide this work. Next, it explains the 
integration of this thesis and provides a brief conclusion about the emergence of the 
autodefensas in Michoacán state. After that, lays out the concept of failed state, its 
origins and evolution, and then challenges the applicability of the concept to Mexico. The 
last section of this chapter examines the impact of the drug prohibition and the 
industrialization process in Michoacán between 1940 and 1950, both of which 
                                                 
1 Adam D. Morton, “The War on Drugs in Mexico: A Failed State?” Third World Quarterly, vol. 33, 
no. 9 (October 2012): 1632. 
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contributed to the configuration of ungoverned spaces in the state. Historical events help 
to draw a better perspective of failed state. 
A. WHY DID THE AUTODEFENSAS EMERGE, SPECIFICALLY IN 
MICHOACÁN, IN 2013? 
There are two primary variables to explain the emergence of the autodefensas. 
First is Mexico’s political reconfiguration from 2000 to 2012, during which the PRD 
governed Michoacán. In 2012, the return of the PRI to power disrupted the informal 
systems that existed at the edge of the legal framework in Michoacán, which explained 
the political transition issues that ensued. The second variable is the active presence of 
organized crime in the Michoacán. A criminal organization called La Familia 
Michoacana, and later the Knights Templars, were able to create an entire network that 
controlled the municipal police, politicians, and the people. It controlled the local 
economy, the mining industry and also controlled the in/out trade flows of the port of 
Lazaro Cardenas. In such cases, the people constructed alternative forms of governance 
in the absence of the “legal authorities.”2 Therefore, the political, social, and organized 
crime relations became the key answering the main question of this thesis, why did the 
autodefensas emerge specifically in Michoacán in 2013? 
For the purpose of this thesis, self-defense groups, or autodefensas, will be 
defined as “a group of people who organize themselves into groups to take the law into 
their own hands in order to reprimand criminals and protect their community.”3 In light 
of this definition, an “ungoverned territory” will be considered as “an area in which the 
state faces significant challenges in establishing control.”4 
                                                 
2 Anne Clunan, and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in 
an Era of Softened Sovereignty (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 19.  
3 Moritz Schuberth, “Challenging the Weak States Hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and 
Brazil,” Peace, Conflict & Development no. 20 (April 2013): 40.  
4 Angel Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 1.  
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B. THESIS OUTLINE 
This work will be divided into four chapters. Chapter I introduces the overall 
study. Chapter II analyzes the existence of ungoverned spaces in Michoacán. First, it 
examines how the cartels have fought against each other to achieve control of the state. 
The purpose of this discussion is to understand the complex criminal systems within the 
state. Then, the chapter explores two weaknesses, the security and governance 
apparatuses. It offers some evidence of the extent of organized crime’s penetration into 
the security and governance institutions. This discussion focuses on providing 
understanding as to how organized crime has infiltrated the security and governance 
apparatuses. 
Chapter III discusses the contemporary version of the emergence of the 
autodefensas at the beginning of 2013. The beginning point and the model for the 
movement are the organizations that arose in the town of Cherán. This chapter also 
identifies the recognized leaders of those organizations, whose principal objective was to 
expel the Knights Templar from the state of Michoacán. In addition, Chapter III explores 
the importance of the state in relation to geography, agricultural, and industrial 
production. 
In this thesis, some aspects of discussion are deliberately left out of the argument. 
The first aspect left out is the state of democracy in Mexico, as the author does not imply 
that democracy is part of the problem. Although Mexico is a democratic country with 
defects, it is acceptable in terms of legality and institutional integrity. Its laws, public and 
private institutions, political parties, and the electoral systems, work well, even though 
some systemic deficiencies need to be improved to become a high-quality democracy. 
Also not included in the discussion are the neoliberal reforms implemented in México; 
some observers argue that these economic reforms have affected the development and the 
welfare of the society.5 
                                                 
5 Coletta Youngers, and Eileen Rosin, “Drogas y Democracia en America Latina, El Impacto de la 
Politica de Estados Unidos [Drugs and democracy in Latin America, The impact of U.S. policy],” in La 
Guerra contra las Drogas Impulsada por Estados Unidos: Su Impacto en America Latina y el Caribe [The 
war on drugs promoted by United States: Its impact in Latin America and the Caribbean], ed. Coletta A. 
Youngers, and Eileen Rosin (Buenos Aires, Argentina: WOLA, 2005), 10.  
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Chapter IV provides a conclusion to this work. The purpose of this thesis is to 
show that self-defense groups emerged in Mexico, specifically in Michoacán, due to 
various factors, such as the relations of power with different political actors. Therefore, 
different political parties in the transition of power have caused an unbalance in the 
system, not in the sense that power alternation affects democracy, but in the ways that 
have affected the informal economies. In addition, organized crime in Michoacán is 
functioning as a parallel system of governance in the state. Because of this, political, 
social and organized crime relations have emerged in ungoverned spaces where the state 
is no longer present. 
C. THE INVENTION OF THE FAILED STATE 
The concept of failed state is relatively new. On the other hand, the theory about 
successful and unsuccessful states can be traced back to Max Weber,6 a German 
sociologist writing in the nineteenth century, who focused primarily on the question of 
“state” legitimacy.7 Weber defines the state as a “human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”8 In 
addition, he notes that territory is part of the state’s characteristics. Thus, paradoxical as it 
may seem, the monopoly on the use of violence is the factor that allows for the existence 
of both the rule of law and the welfare of the state.  
During the 1990s, writers like Gerald Helman, Steven Ratner, William Zartman, 
Charles Tilly, and Noam Chomsky discussed the pertinence of the concept and the proper 
definition. Due to discrepancies between the writers’ points of view, the literature has 
been using different terms for the concept, such as fragile state, rogue, shadow, failing, 
collapsed, and others. 
                                                 
6 Some scholars consider that as early as the seventeenth or eighteenth century theories of failed state 
existed, as is illustrated by Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury in Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power 
of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, 1651.  
7 Max Weber, “Politik als Beruf [Politics as a vocation]” (Munich, Germany: Duncker and Humblodt 




In 1992, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner attempted to define the concept of 
failed state. They referred to such nations as “simply unable to function as independent 
entities”9 and included in this category countries like Haiti, Yugoslavia, the United Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), Chad, Ghana, and Somalia. Additionally, they stated, 
“governmental structures have been overwhelmed by circumstances,”10 but they did not 
explain what those circumstances were. Contrary to this idea, Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks 
posits that the concept does not properly explain the condition of countries that have 
waged armed conflict and civil wars and now suffer a debilitated existence.11 Moreover, 
Charles T. Call goes beyond that and states, 
Just as the State Failure Task Force has done, scholars should abandon the 
concept of state failure, and put renewed effort into devising categories of 
analysis that will be denotatively and connotatively clear, useful, and 
discriminating.12 
The State Failure Task Force to which Call refers was a multidisciplinary research 
project funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1994. The primary objective 
of the task force was to analyze and identify the causes of state failure in countries that 
could be denominated as failed; in other words, those countries that represented risk for 
the international security.13 After the September 11 attacks, the concept of the failed state 
was brought to the attention of the international community. Now, it is linked with the 
war on terror; the task force searches for reducing areas that will function as a sanctuary 
for terrorist organizations.  
Currently, it is possible to identify at least eight indexes that rate state failure; the 
most well-known is the Failed State Index, created by the Fund for Peace and published 
annually. The principal objective of the index is to provide analysis of 178 countries 
                                                 
9 Gerald B. Helman, and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed State,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992): 4. 
10 Ibid., 5. 
11 Rosa E. Brooks, “Failed States, or the State as Failure?” The University of Chicago Law Review 72 
no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 1161.  
12 Charles T. Call, “The Fallacy of the Failed State,” Third World Quarterly 29 no. 8 (December 
2008): 1505.  
13 Jack A. Goldstone et al., State Failure Task Force Report (McLean, VA: Science Applications 
International Corporation, 1995), 1.  
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using a particular methodology that considers a state in relation to its capacity of 
responding to certain factors, such as political, economic, and social demands, grouped 
according to 12 indicators.14 Recent studies have criticized the methodological 
weaknesses that were routinely used by the indexes to evaluate state performance.15 
Finally, it is necessary a different approach to understand the particularities of each 
nation state in a historical and globalized context. 
D. BEYOND THE THEORY OF THE FAILED STATE: MEXICO 
The United Mexican States (commonly referred to as Mexico) are composed of 
31 states and one federal district, Mexico City, which is the capital of the country. Similar 
to the government of the United States, Mexico’s government has three branches: the 
executive branch, in the figure of the president; the legislative branch, which is composed 
of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies; and the judicial branch, which is composed 
of the Supreme Court and subordinate courts. 
The president, governors, senators, and deputies are all elected through a public 
democratic process supervised by an electoral entity called the Instituto Nacional 
Electoral (National Electoral Institute). These elections are held every three to six years, 
depending upon the level of authority to be elected. To illustrate this, in the 2012 
elections for the president, senators, and deputies, 49,087,446 Mexicans participated, 
which represents the 63.14 percent of the registered voters.16 In addition, there are 10 
political parties at the national level; however, only three can be considered as major 
parties, including the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party 
(PAN), and Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). 
Regarding its economy since 1994, Mexico has signed 10 free trade agreements 
with 45 countries and 30 reciprocal investment promotion and protection agreements. In 
                                                 
14 Fund for Peace, “The Methodology Behind the Index,” Fragile State Index, accessed August 28, 
2014, http://ffp.statesindex.org/methodology 
15 Francisco Gutierrez et al., Measuring Poor State Performance: Problems, Perspectives and Paths 
Ahead (London: London School of Economics, 2010), 6.  
16 Ricardo Quintero, “La Educación, la Cultura Cívica y las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil en 
México [Education, culture, and civic organizations of civil society in Mexico],” Revista Innovación 
Educativa 12, no. 60 (2012): 149.  
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addition, Mexico is an active participant in multilateral and regional organizations, such 
as the World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.17 Because of these 
agreements, the country is becoming one of the most globalized and open economies. In 
2013, the gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately $1.327 trillion dollars, and it 
is the second largest export market and third largest source of imports to the United 
States.18  
Additionally, Mexico’s export economy is shifting from agriculture to 
manufacturing—especially computers, cars, and appliances.19 In other sectors, such as 
education, health, and jobs, Mexico is improving qualitatively and quantitatively.20 For 
instance in 2012, Mexico achieved universal health coverage with an enrollment of 52.6 
million people in less than a decade.21 In May 2014, the Secretariat of Finance and Public 
Credit (SHCP) estimated an increase in GDP of 2.7 percent,22 meaning that the Mexican 
economy is still growing and is no longer in recession. In contrast, in 2012, according to 
the National Evaluation Council of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), there are 
                                                 
17 Secretariat of Economy: Mexico, “International Trade Negotiations,” last modified 2014, 
http://www.economia.gob.mx/trade-and-investment/foreign-trade/international-trade-negotiations 
18 Central Intelligence Agency, “Mexico,” The World Factbook, accessed August 29, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html  
19 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, Oferta y Demanda Global de Bienes y Servicios 
[Supply and demand of good and services] (Aguascalientes, Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Geografia, 2014), 1.  
20 “How’s Life? Mexico,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, accessed June 
29, 2014, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/mexico/ 
21 “Mexico Achieves Universal Health Coverage, Enrolls 52.6 Million People,” Harvard University 
School of Public Health, August 2012, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/mexico-universal-
health/ 
22 Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, “La Secretaria de Hacienda Estima un Crecimiento del 
PIB para el 2014 de 2.7 por Ciento [The Secretariat of Finance estimated a growth of 2.7 percent of the 
GDP for 2014] (Mexico City: Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, 2014), accessed August 29, 2014, 
http://www.hacienda.gob.mx/Biblioteca_noticias_home/comunicado_045_2014.pdf  
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53.3 million people living in poverty conditions.23 What conflicting the figures 
demonstrate is the inequality that exists among the Mexican people.  
The security apparatus in Mexico includes military organizations, such as the 
Army, Air Force, and Navy, along with the federal police, and a new organization called 
the Gendarmerie, which possesses a combination of police and military training. 
Mexico’s armed forces have assumed a leading role in the fight against organized crime; 
however, at the state and municipal level, the law enforcement is weak, as authorities are 
in charge of the prosecution of common crimes like robbery and kidnapping. Certain data 
shows that municipal governments punish only five percent of common crimes, which 
means that the probability of getting away with committing a crime is 95 percent.24 
Therefore, security and justice have become subjects of constant analysis because public 
safety is an essential part of the welfare of the society. In this context, the rule of law 
must create the necessary conditions that allow citizens to perform their daily activities 
with the confidence that their lives, property, and other assets are exempt from all danger. 
E. UNGOVERNED SPACES 
Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have been working since the 1920s when 
the international community “began prohibiting the production, consumption, and 
distribution of alcohol and psychotropic substances.”25 Thus, the emergence of drug 
trafficking has a direct relationship to the creation of the post-revolutionary Mexican 
State.26  
                                                 
23 Consejo Nacional de Evaulacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social, “Medicion de la Pobreza en 
Mexico y en las Entidades Federativas 2012 [Measurement of poverty in Mexico and in the state 2012]” 




24 Hector Aguilar Camin, “On Mexican Violence,” in Rethinking the War on Drugs through the U.S.-
Mexico Prism, ed. Ernesto Zedillo, and Haynie Wheeler (New Haven, CT: Betts House, 2012), 47.   
25 Luis Astorga, and David A. Shirk, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in 
the U.S.-Mexican Context” (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 2010), accessed September 10, 
2014, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8j647429 
26 Salvador Maldonado Aranda, “The Drug Trafficking in the Rural Mexico, Illicit Crops, Territories, 
and Drugs in Latin America, Comparative Perspectives,” DILEMAS vol. 5, no. 4 (October 2012): 583. 569–
595 
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In Michoacán, the industrial growth between 1940 and 1950 attracted the 
attention of companies and businessman. They were able to commercialize profitable 
resources such as mining and agriculture. The government’s purpose was to integrate the 
entire region into the political and national economy.27 New lines of communication were 
created, and there were provisions of financial support to local farmers. Because of the 
actions of the government to promote growth, the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank develop a good impression of Mexico because of these actions. The 
commercialization of the production of Michoacán not only made businessman and 
political caciques rich but also drug dealers. They began to use the new infrastructure to 
expand their illegal businesses.28  
Other factors contributed to organized crime settling in Michoacán, such as the 
change in the cocaine supply to the United States from Colombia, the topography, 
climate, and the highway system that connected to the North border of Mexico. The 
increasing importance of the port of Lázaro Cárdenas, located in the Michoacán state on 
the Pacific Ocean, was another factor because it was the location of the imported and 
exported products coming from Asia. In summary, historical events, as well as the legal 
and illegal economies within state and non-state actors, helped configure ungoverned 
spaces or areas that were loosely governed. 
                                                 
27 Aranda, “The Drug Trafficking in the Rural Mexico, Illicit Crops, Territories, and Drugs in Latin 
America,” 584. 
28 Salvador Maldonado Aranda, “Drogas, Violencia y Militarizacion en el Mexico Rural: El caso de 
Michoacán” [Drugs, violence and militarization in the rural Mexico: The Michoacán case],” Revista 
Mexicana de Sociologia 74, no. 1 (2012): 11. 
 10
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II. THE CONFIGURATION OF UNGOVERNED SPACES IN 
MICHOACÁN, MEXICO  
It is important to contextualize the notion of federalism in Mexico before 
analyzing the configuration of ungoverned spaces in Michoacán. In Mexico, federalism 
has existed since the nineteenth century, as laid out in the constitutions of 1824, 1857, 
and 1917,29 particularly when the country was established in the form of federal 
representative republic.30 The principal objective was to create a united nation in which 
each state could achieve the progress and development that it could not achieve 
independently.31  
According to these constitutions, the executive is unitary, the people must elect it, 
and presidents will only serve one term.32 During the first 100 years of Mexico’s 
existence as an independent state, liberals, conservatives, federalists, republicans, 
centralists, and the monarchy fought against each other to control the country. Then, 
President Porfirio Diaz Mori established the longest dictatorship (1877–1880 and 1884–
1911). It is important to mention that the Porfiriato left the country with a solid 
productive and industrialized system, but it contrasted with a profound social disparity 
and disorder that ended in the revolution in 1910. 
Besides the political power given by the constitution to the president, it is 
necessary to add the formation of a political party capable of gathering all the power in 
favor for the president.33 For instance, the PRI has its roots in 1929, when former 
president General Plutarco Elias Calles (1924–1928) founded the National Revolutionary 
                                                 
29 Jorge Carpizo, “Notas sobre el Presidencialismo Mexicano [Notes about the Mexican 
Presidentialism],” Revista de Estudios Politicos 3 (1978): 20. 
30 Miguel Carbonell, El Federalismo en México: Principios Generales y Distribución de 
Competencias [Federalism in Mexico: General principles and distribution of competencies] (Mexico City: 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 2005), 379.  
31 Carpizo, “Notes about the Mexican Presidentialism,” 20. 
32 This term was applied until the constitution of 1917, and only after Plutarco Elias Calles that the 
presidential term went from 4 to 6 years. 
33 Cordova Gutierrez, Carbonell Bolaños, and Silva Pelaez, Ensayos sobre el Presidencialismo 
Mexicano, [Essays about Mexican Presidentialism] (Mexico City: Aldus, 1994), 66.  
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Party (PNR). Certainly, the foundation of the PRN is called maximato;34 in other words, 
General Calles wanted to continue rule the country by being the man behind the power 
(behind the President in functions) until the differences between him and General Lazaro 
Cárdenas del Río (1934–1940) caused the exile of Calles.35 
In 1980, former President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982–1988) stated, “The 
executive branch has traditionally been the most powerful of the Mexican government. 
This situation is due to deep historical and social conditions and cannot be explained 
simplistically.”36 The power relationship between federal and state governors was in the 
form of the centralization of power, and it was maintained in the same way for more than 
70 years when the PRI ruled Mexico. 
In 2000, with the arrival of the PAN to the presidential office, the power 
relationship changed. It moved from a centralized decision-making process to a 
decentralized one, where governors at the state level gained political autonomy. It can be 
argued that decentralization in the political system generated competition, conflict, and 
lack of cooperation between different levels of government due to two conditions. First, 
intergovernmental actors originated from different political parties; and second, the lack 
of transparency in accountability originated from the absence of an efficient mechanism 
of coordination.37 
This chapter is concerned with the configuration of ungoverned spaces, through 
which it considers aspects such as how drug cartels have fought against other cartels to 
achieve control of the state. The purpose of this discussion is to understand the complex 
criminal systems within the state. In addition, this thesis will consider aspects, such as 
                                                 
34 The Maximato is the period under which, even though there were other presidents Plutarco Elias 
Calles remained the “jefe maximo.” Behind Presidents Portes Gil, Ortiz Rubio, and Abelardo Rodriguez, 
while presidents still have to obey Elias Calles. 
35 Cesar Cansino, “De la Crisis Politica a la Transicion Pactada: El Caso de Mexico en Perspectiva 
Comparada [From the political crisis to the negotiated transition: The case of Mexico in comparative 
perspective],” Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales 40, no. 162 (December 1995): 125. 
36 Miguel De La Madrid Hurtado, Estudios de Derecho Constitucional [Studies of constitutional law], 
3rd ed. (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1980), 248.  
37 Enrique Cabrero Mendoza, “Gobierno y Politica Local en Mexico: Luces y Sombras de las 
Reformas Descentralizadoras [Local Government and Politics in Mexico: Lights and Shadows of 
decentralization reforms],” Politica y Sociedad 47, no. 3 (2010): 175. 
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social support that favored organized crime, which allowed it to remain and expand in 
these regions. As well as other factors that allow the configuration of the ungoverned 
spaces in Michoacán. 
A. CONFIGURING UNGOVERNED SPACES 
Since 2007, there are ongoing attempts to unify the police command in the 
country and to promote only one chain of command. In addition in 2016, the justice 
systems will change from inquisitorial to accusatorial in response to the reforms 
implemented in 2008.38 However, while these measures are carried out, the security crisis 
now affects the governability of certain areas of Mexico, such as the states of Michoacán, 
Tamaulipas, and Guerrero. Drug cartels, which had been hidden powers, expanded their 
radius of action through power struggles between the each other and by launching an 
offensive against the state and society. Depending upon the state location, insecurity 
comes in different forms. In México, not all drug cartels operate in the same way; some 
more violent than others, and each interacts differently with the authorities and the 
community. 
1. The Fight for Hegemony of the State 
To achieve the hegemony of the state, organized crime needs certain essential 
conditions. First, it acquires control of the territory by corrupting the local authorities. 
Second, it obtains sufficient financial support, and third, it oppresses the vast majority of 
the population by creating a system of terror. 
In the 1990s, a criminal organization called Los Valencia—later called Cartel del 
Milenio (Millennium Cartel)—controlled the production and distribution of marijuana 
and the flow of cocaine coming from Colombia. According to Ricardo Ravelo, it 
provided those drugs to the Cartel de Ciudad Juarez and later to the Tijuana and Sinaloa 
cartels.”39 In 1990s, there was a relative calm in the state because the cartel was 
                                                 
38 Secretariat of Government, “Agreements Approved by the Coordinating Council for the 
Implementation of the Criminal Justice System,” Diario Oficial de la Federacion, August 17, 2010, 
http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5155512&fecha=17/08/2010  
39 Ricardo Ravelo, Los Capos. Las narco-rutas de Mexico (Mexico City: Debolsillo 2005), 196–204.  
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dedicated to the drug business. However, by the late twentieth century, according to 
George Grayson, due to the successful campaigns launched by U.S. to stop the flow of 
cocaine from Colombia to Miami and from there to the eastern of United States, Mexico 
came to play a big role in the drug-trafficking business.40  
In 2001, when the Cartel del Golfo (Gulf Cartel) sent its gunmen, Los Zetas, to 
take control of the territory, it sparked a fierce battle in the state. Los Zetas looked for 
local allies and eventually managed to expel the opposition; meanwhile, the violence in 
Michoacán reached its peak. As a result, Los Zetas took control of the route for cocaine 
from the Pacific coast to Tamaulipas. 
In 2006, a new criminal organization made its appearance by throwing five heads 
into a discotheque with the message, “La Familia (The Family) does not kill for pay. It 
does not kill women, does not kill innocents, and just kills those who should die. This is 
divine justice.”41 This organization, La Familia Michoacana (Michoacan Family) as 
members called themselves, was led by Nazario Moreno Gonzalez (The Craziest One);42 
La Familia Michoacana was to be the organization that would end the extortions, 
kidnappings, and liberate the state from Los Zetas. Or so it promised.  
Meanwhile in 2006, the former president Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2006‒2012) 
launched a military campaign (Operation Michoacán) in the state to end the violence 
generated by these rival organizations. The pressure exerted by the federal government 
on one side, and La Familia on the other against Los Zetas, ended with the expulsion of 
the latter. It can be inferred that its expulsion was because Los Zetas’ logistics system 
was severely damaged, which complicated and compromised the transportation of illegal 
products to the north. 
                                                 
40 George W. Grayson, ed. “Shift in Cocaine Flow, the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas,” in The Cartels: 
The Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations and Their Impact on U.S. Security (Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2014), 50.  
41 Jaime Marquez, “Narcos Decapitan a otros Cinco en Michoacán [Narcos Behead Another Five in 
Michoacán],” El Universal, September 7, 2006, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/27599.html 
42 In 2010, Gonzalez was reported killed in a shooting with the federal police, then in March 2014 his 
death was confirmed by federal officials, which meant he was reported to have died twice. 
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In 2011, the Caballeros Templarios (Knights Templars) emerged as a splinter of 
La Familia Michoacana. The organization was led by Servando Gomez Martinez (La 
Tuta [the Teacher]), a former school teacher. This criminal organization adopted the same 
modus operandi as the previous one. Servando described his organization as a 
“brotherhood founded by a set of statutes and codes, dedicated to protect the Michoacán 
people from organized crime.”43 However, the Knights Templar also diversified its 
activities so that the drug business was no longer its principal source of income. On 
average, the monthly income of the Knights Templar was about 80.8 million pesos (6.3 
million USD).44 
2. Social Support 
The Familia Michoacana and later the Knights Templars both denied being drug 
cartels, and each considered itself a religious organization whose fundamental principle 
was helping and protecting the community to gain social support. They claimed to 
administrate “divine justice” to rapists, bandits, and other criminals. One of the 
statements of the Knights Templar was “our only plea is that we love our state and we are 
no longer willing to tolerate the dignity of our people getting run over.”45 
These criminal organizations take credit for building schools and roads and lend 
money to farmers and others in need. They claim they are strengthening the community 
spirit and say “all members are from Michoacán.”46 In addition, La Familia Michoacana 
took advantage of the economic crisis of 2007. A study by Grayson “found that 79 
percent of the population in Michoacán lived in poverty.”47 Approximately more than 1.2 
                                                 
43 “Knights Templars Profile,” InSightCrime, accessed September 15, 2014, 
http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/knights-templar-profile  
44 Different open sources such as Milenio, El Universal, and Proceso and Revolucion Tres Punto Cero 
have pointed out the monthly income of the Knights Templars was about 80.8 million pesos (6.3 million 
USD).  
45 Raul R. Villamil Uriarte, “Michoacán como Laboratorio Social del Proyecto de Autogestión 
Comunitaria Armada. ¿Estado en Disolución, Fallido, Fragmentado o Vacío de Poder? [Michoacán as a 
laboratory project of armed community: State solution, failed, fragmented or power vacuum?],” El 
Cotidiano no. 187 (September 2014): 82. 
46 Ibid. 
47 George W. Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies, 2010), 10. 
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million people lacked basic health services coverage, so those criminals claimed to be 
there to provide those services that the state could not. 
Another aspect that allow the rise of La Familia Michoacana was the migration of 
many men from Michoacán to California and further north into the United States to earn 
enough money to sustain their families, which left their towns without adult male 
presence or with a significantly decreased one. According to George Grayson, “males 
who remained in the state often gravitated to the narco-economy, which constituted far 
more than growing drugs.”48 For most individuals, the decision to support the drug 
traffickers was influenced by the behavior of organized crime.49 As Victoria Malkin 
states, “to ensure success for drug-trafficking organizations they will have to consolidate 
themselves as a social group.”50 
3. Geographic Conditions and State Weakness 
According to Maldonado, many municipalities in the “Apatzingan valley became 
narco-towns because of its geographic conditions,”51 which allowed growing drugs 
between the high and lower lands. Also, the Sierra Madre del Sur (Mountain Range of the 
South) extends to the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guerrero. Some points between 
those states, according to Maldonado Aranda, are called “small golden triangles because 
the state´s security apparatuses simply have no presence there.”52 The major drug 
plantations are located in the vicinity of the mountain range. 
The difficulty in accessing those zones forced the federal government to build 
runways to provide better communication with the towns in those areas; however, the 
drug dealers began using these runways for drug trafficking. To say that the nation-state 
has the absolute monopoly on the use of force within its territory is in this case naive. As 
                                                 
48 Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel, 11. 
49 Gordon H. McCormick, and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
Guerrilla Mobilisation,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 299. 
50 Victoria Malkin, “Narcotrafficking, Migration, and Modernity in Rural México,” Latin America 
Perspectives 28, no. 4 (July 2001): 121. 101–128 
51 Maldonado, “Drugs, Violence, and Militarization in the Rural Mexico: The Michoacán Case,” 12. 
52 Ibid. 
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Adam D. Morton states, “It is not possible to capture the Mexican state totally because of 
its large, complex, and shifting relational identity that has taken contrasting forms over 
time and space.”53 
Arguably, there is a relationship between the state’s weakness and the current 
violence and the lack of infrastructure in difficult terrains has isolated some communities 
and made it difficult to deliver basic social services. However, those areas are propitious 
for criminals for their recruitment process and so increase its manpower. As a result, the 
criminal organization is functioning as a provider of employment and services. 
4. Political Change and the Informal Rules 
Drug trafficking has been present in Michoacán for many years; however, it can 
be argued that during the last three state governments, these activities increased.54 For 
instance, according to Grayson, 
The debilitation of the PRI shattered the networks that, while infused with 
corruption, enforced the rules of the game that constrained violence, 
curbed impunity, provided services to the faithful, and invested the masses 
with a tenuous link to decision makers.55  
During the administration of the former governor Lazaro Cardenas Batel (PRD, 
2002‒2008) the extortion of the municipal authorities started, and he requested help to 
former president Vicente Fox (2000–2006) because in Michoacán drug cartels had a 
strong presence inside the municipal authorities. It was 2006 when former President 
Calderon launched his version of the war on drugs (Operation Michoacan). One of the 
justifications for Calderon to send the federal forces to Michoacán was the idea that drug 
traffickers were fighting to take control of territorial spaces from the government. In 
                                                 
53 Morton, “The War on Drugs in Mexico: A Failed State?,” 1637. 
54 Jaime Rivera Velazquez, “Los Limites de la Depredacion [The limits of predation],” NEXOS, 
accessed September 4, 2014, http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=20022 
55 Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel, 10. 
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several “regions of the country, they are threatening the state level, and have penetrated 
its institutional structure.”56  
During the period of Leonel Godoy Rangel (PRD, 2008‒2012), there were several 
communication problems between him and the federal government because of the lack of 
coordination and cooperation related to the security matters. Under his administration, 
there was neither investigation nor prevention of crime because he argued that organized 
crime was the responsibility of the federal authorities.57 For instance, the conflict had its 
breaking point when federal forces arrested 30 municipal authorities in 2009 (Operation 
House Cleaning), and the arrested authorities were charged with having connections to 
organized crime. For example, Grayson states, “after the first five armed incursions into 
the state, Calderon changed his strategy to focus on politicians who were enabling La 
Familia and other cartels to act with impunity.”58 The reason for this approach was due to 
the infiltration of La Familia Michoacana in the municipalities,59 during which time the 
working relationship between the federal and state governments deteriorated. The half-
brother of Governor Godoy was elected federal deputy for the PRD and was accused of 
having links with La Familia Michoacana.60 Currently, he is a fugitive from justice. 
The security problems continued to increase in the state; Godoy Rangel and 
Fausto Vallejo Figueroa (PRI, 2012–2014) encountered similar problems. However, 
Fausto Vallejo resigned as governor on June 18, 2014, claiming health problems. His 
administration was questioned because of a significant indicator of insecurity, the 
emergence of a civil armed group that displaced the local authorities. Additionally, his 
former secretary of the government, Jesus Reyna Garcia, was arrested in April 2014 
                                                 
56 Cesar Morales Oyarvide, “La Guerra Contra el Narcotrafico en México, Debilidad del Estado, 
Orden Local y Fracaso de una Estrategia [The drug war in Mexico, weak state and local order failed 
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57 Jaime Velazquez Rivera, “Crimen Organizado y Autodefensas en Mexico: El Caso de Michoacán, 
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58 Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel, 65. 
59 Ibid., 62. 
60 “SSP: El Hermano de Leonel Godoy Vinculado a la Familia; Esta Profugo [SSP: Leonel Godoy’s 
brother linked to “La Familia;” is fugitive],” PROCESO, June 14, 2009, accessed September 5, 2014, 
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because he made a deal with the Knights Templar to favor the PRI in the election process 
of 2011. Perhaps this is why organized crime has acted freely in the state.  
Likewise, Rodrigo Gerardo Vallejo Mora, the son of former Governor Fausto 
Vallejo Figueroa, was accused of covering up dealings with the Knights Templar; this 
stems from a video showing their conversations. He too has faced a judicial process 
starting in August 2014.61 Because there are five politicians who have been linked to 
organized crime, and the people do not believe in the formal structures, there is an urgent 
need for stable institutions capable of carrying out the law. 
The informal rules that exist at the margins of the state were ingredients for La 
Familia Michoacana to become powerful. For example, the criminal organization has 
regulated the price of avocados, lemons, and other agricultural products. The perception 
that Michoacán people have about La Familia is that it is a huge organization that 
controls the state. An example of this is the delayed construction of one federal prison in 
La Ruana municipality of Buena Vista Tomatlán.62 The facility was supposed to be 
completed in December 2012, but the pressure and extortion of this criminal organization 
made completion impossible. The balance of power between La Familia and the state 
government shifted in favor of the criminals. Thus, the “legal government” did not exert 
actual control over the population; instead, it exerted an artificial control. 
5. Culture and the Use of Mass Media 
In Michoacán, certain areas are identified with the ranchero culture, which 
directly supported the drug trafficking.63 As Maldonado stated, “this culture is 
characterized by the values of individualism against the state and the family against 
                                                 
61 Marco Campillo, “Consignan a Hijo de Fausto Vallejo por Encubrimiento [Fausto Vallejo’s son is 
in jail for concealment],” MILENIO, April 8, 2014, accessed September 5, 2014, 
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society.”64 In this context, the ranchero code created networks of brotherhood between 
those who cultivated the drugs and the traffickers. The farmers prefer to plant an acre of 
marijuana rather than corn because it provides more economic profit. Thus, drugs have 
become part of the culture and the economy, but more importantly, people have adopted 
to this as a way of life.65 The territories in Michoacán are somehow complex networks 
that include family, economic, and political aspects. As a consequence, the areas where 
drug trafficking is part of the economy, systems are breeding criminal activities; 
therefore, the state no longer controls that area. 
The drug problem has been central to most of the media; it was a topic that all 
news programs, magazines, and newspapers devote a special section in its transmission. 
Rather than being a deterrent element, this has contributed to more young people 
have joining criminal organizations. In March 2011, in response to this problem, the 
federal government signed a 10-point pact with the mass media. The principal 
objective of this pact was to reduce the graphic images presented, which could 
empower drug cartels by promoting their actions.66 To counteract the 
government’s agreement, the Familia Michoacana and the Knights Templar began 
to use the local radio station, printed journals, and electronic means to spread its 
message and justify its actions.  
The corrupting power of drug trafficking has also infiltrated some media. For 
example, on September 22, the news portal MVS displayed two reporters, Eliseo 
Caballero of TELEVISA—the main television network in Mexico—and Jose Luis Diaz 
of the agency Esquema. They met with the leader of the Knights Templar, Servado 
Gomez Martinez (La Tuta) and advised him on how to develop strategic communications 
to gain more presence in the media. At the end of the video, the reporters accepted money 
64 Aranda, “Drogas, Violencia y Militarizacion en el Mexico Rural: El Caso de Michoacán,” 14. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Fabiola Martinez, “Pacto de Medios para Limitar Informacion sobre Violencia [Media’s pact for 
limiting information on violence],” La Jornada, March 21, 2011, 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/03/25/politica/005n1pol 
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in exchange for their services.67 This illustrates the penetration of organized crime and 
the control that it exerts on the media. 
B. CONCLUSION 
In the configurations of ungoverned spaces in Michoacán, it is possible to see the 
following factors. First, the state and its legal institutions do not permeate the entire 
Michoacán society.68 Therefore, other organizations are appropriated to the role of the 
state as a provider,69 such as the Familia Michoacana and later the Knights Templars. As 
Stewart Patrick states, “The relationship between transnational organized crime and weak 
states is parasitic. All things being equal, criminal networks are drawn to environments 
where the rule of law is absent or imperfectly applied.”70 Additionally, the ranchero 
culture has low obedience with the law, and consequentially, participants in the ranchero 
culture were involved in illegal activities; thus, state was no longer the primary source of 
authority.71  
Second, corruption in legal institutions, as it was shown in this chapter, has 
diminished state authority; therefore, security problems have increased with the 
emergence of the autodefensas in 2013. Because many state government officials 
participate in illegal drug networks, drug trafficking have overshadowed the formal 
structures of power and created informal economies that are beyond the scope of the 
state.  
Finally, the wide presence of organized crime in Michoacán has challenged the 
state’s monopoly on the use of violence and the added corruption by local police who 
worked for organized crime. The two drug cartels displaced the state government and 
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forced citizens to pay taxes to the criminals for protection. All of these factors have 
provided the conditions for the configuration of ungoverned spaces in Michoacán. In the 
end, the criminal activities have become part of the economy, the social system, and daily 
life; the population accepts the participation of criminal organizations, whether they like 
it or not. 
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III. MICHOACÁN AND ITS AUTODEFENSAS  
During the last decade, public security in Mexico has experienced several issues. 
Organized crime, with its firepower and money, has exposed the weakness of municipal 
and state governments. These governments have poorly armed, untrained, and 
inadequately paid police forces, which represent the first line of defense of the Mexican 
state. The phrase plata o plomo (silver or lead) represents the breaking point for most 
municipal police. How can these police forces face the threat that organized crime 
represents? For decades, these fragile police forces have maintained order in the country, 
which prompts the question as to why the security crisis has only recently begun.  
The violence generated by non-state actors that affects some communities reveals 
the infiltration of organized crime in all levels of government. This scenario is one of 
many that President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012‒2018) and his staff have had to deal with. 
On December 1, 2012, President Peña took office for the PRI after 12 years of being in 
the opposition party. That same day, President Peña announced his state policy based on 
five fundamental axes.72 The principal objective of this plan is to reduce homicides, 
kidnapping, and extortion, most of which were related to organized crime. However, 
government’s policy apparently has not been working because of the perception of the 
citizens regarding the overall violence in the state. The percentage of citizens who did not 
support the government rose from 72.3 percent in 2013 to 73.3 percent between March 
and April of 2014,73 which means there was an increase of a full percentage point in only 
two months. 
This chapter discusses the contemporary version of the emergence of the 
autodefensas. It begins with the model for the movement for the organizations that arose 
in the town of Cheran. This chapter also lays out who are the recognized leaders of those 
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organizations. In addition, Chapter III explores the importance of the state in relation to 
geography, agricultural, and industrial production. 
A. A TOWN NAMED CHERAN, THE BEGINNING 
On February 24, 2013, the autodefensas emerged in three communities of Tierra 
Caliente74 in Michoacán: La Ruana, Tepacaltepec, and Buenavista. The objective of the 
autodefensas was to end the 12-year dictatorial regime of the Knights Templar cartel over 
the state. The motivational model for the movement was the peasant organization of the 
Purepecha plateau,75 which since 2011 began to organize, arm, and self-govern with the 
objective of protecting themselves by expelling organized crime from the area. 
The first indigenous community to organize into a form of contemporary self-
defense groups was that of Cheran. In Cheran, the social system was damaged, and its 
stability was threatened. The government in Cheran could no longer properly function 
and maintain the legitimate use of violence because non-state actors had taken control. In 
other words, the state no longer monopolized the means of coercion within that 
municipality.76 
In April 2011, these members of the town took over the entire local security by 
arming and organizing their own government. Their decision had its legal foundation in 
Article 2 of the Mexican Constitution, in the International Labor Organization 
Convention 169, and in the United Nations’ Declaration of Indigenous People. One year 
later, the community organized its municipal elections77 and decided to separate from any 
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political party or form of intervention from the state government. This was the first step 
to achieve autonomy.  
In May 2014, the Supreme Court recognized the rights of the indigenous 
community of Cheran, Michoacán, to choose, by the method of customs, its municipal 
authorities and to enable them to bring constitutional challenges against reforms that they 
considered a violation of the fundamental rights of the inhabitants. The decision of the 
Supreme Court changed the criterion, saying that municipalities were not entitled to bring 
constitutional challenges against acts that violated the rights of communities and 
indigenous peoples.78 
Beginning with the community of Tepalcatepec in February 2013, the 
autodefensas adopted a form of civil guards to protect the community. This town became 
the center of experience and support for others municipalities in the area.79 By mid-2013, 
it formed the General Council of Community Self-Defense, the primary function of 
which was to organize groups to achieve collective agreements in the decision-making 
process. At this point, the autodefensas was no longer a guerrilla movement in which a 
small group of armed people used hit-and-run tactics, and they were no longer against the 
established government. These reforms constituted the expressions of organized people in 
defense of their fundamental rights.  
B. VISIBLE LEADERS OF THE AUTODEFENSAS 
One characteristic of the leaders of the autodefensas is that they belong to the 
towns where the security problems are particularly severe. In addition, key leaders are 
also charismatic and appealing to the population, enabling them to attract more followers 
to their movement. Like the local population, they share the same grievances. The self-
                                                 
78 Direccion General de Comunicacion y Vinculacion Social, “Suprema Corte de Justicia Reconoce a 
los Pueblos Indigenas el Derecho a la Consulta [The Supreme Court of Justice recognizes the right of 
indigenous people to consultation],” no. 87, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion, May 29, 2014, 
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/red/coordinacion/COMUNICADO_87_2014.pdf  
79 Tierra Caliente has a population of 500,000, the Meseta Purepecha has 120,000 inhabitants, and the 
avocado area 600,000 (major population centers: Uruapan, Tancítaro, Los Reyes, Tacámbaro, Ario de 
Rosales, and Zitácuaro). The population of the state of Michoacán in 2013 was 4.5 million and Morelia the 
state capital was 700,000. In other words, about 30 percent of the population in Michoacán lived in areas 
where they had formed Autodefensas.  
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defense groups are comprised of farmers, professionals, and even politicians in 
Michoacán. The question here is why did the Michoacán people join the autodefensas? 
The answer is because it was better to join the autodefensas than to continue paying 
organized criminals bribes for their right to live and work.  
1. Hipolito Mora Chavez 
Hipolito Mora Chavez was the original founder of autodefensas. In February 
2013, he was the first to take arms against the Knights Templar in La Ruana. On March 
2014, he was arrested and accused of the probable homicide of Rafael Sanchez Moreno, 
also known as “El Pollo,” and Jose Luis Torres Castañeda. It is interesting to note that 
both belonged to the Knights Templar and the autodefensas.80 According to the news 
portal Aristeguinoticias.com, Jose Luis Torres Castañeda was the father of Jose Luis 
Torres, who worked for the PRD senator of Michoacán, Iris Vianey Mendoza Mendoza.81 
As the leader of the autodefensas in La Ruana, Hipolito Mora was accused not only of his 
probable participation in these murders but also of another 35 felony charges; however, 
after 65 days in jail, he was released from all charges.82 After leaving jail, he enlisted in 
the Fuerza Rural Estatal (Rural State Force). 
2. Jose Manuel Mireles Valverde 
Jose Manuel Mireles Valverde was a doctor by profession, working for the Red 
Cross in Sacramento, California. In 2008, he was a candidate for state congressman for 
the PRD, but he lost the election. His name was one of the first to come to the public eye 
as a spokesman between the autodefensas and the state and federal government. On June 
28, 2014, he was arrested along with 72 others in the port of Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacán 
                                                 
80 “Hipólito Mora, Detenido por el Asesinato de dos Autodefensas [Hipolito Mora, arrested for the 
murder of two autodefensas],” Aristegui Noticias Network, March 12, 2014, accessed June 29, 2014, 
http://aristeguinoticias.com/1203/mexico/hipolito-mora-detenido-por-el-asesinato-de-dos-autodefensas/ 
81 Iris Vianey Mendoza is a senator for the PRD; she has been working as Secretary of the Board, 
Commission of Foreign Relations Committee Asia-Pacific, Member of the National Defense Commission 
and Secretary of the Committee of Public Safety. 
82 Eliseo Caballero, “Hipolito Mora Sale de la Carcel [Hipolito Mora is out of Jail],” Noticieros 
Televisa, May 17, 2014, http://noticieros.televisa.com/mexico-estados/1405/hipolito-mora-sale-carcel/  
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for violating the Federal Firearms and Explosives Law.83 He was charged with carrying 
weapons that were intended for the exclusive use of the Mexican Armed Forces. Mireles 
is the only founder of the autodefensas who did not enlist in the Rural State Force. 
3. Estanislao Beltran Torres 
Estanislao Beltran Torres, also known as “Papa Pitufo” (Papa Smurf), replaced 
Mireles as a spokesman and coordinator of the autodefensas. He worked as a farmer and 
then became Comisario Ejidal (Delegate Ejidal) in his community. However, the group of 
La Ruana, led by Hipolito Mora, accused Estanislao “of representing others’ interests that 
were not related to the fight.”84 On May 10, 2014, he was the first so-called leader to join 
the Rural State Force. 
Recently, these leaders have started to fight for primary leadership; this reflects 
the instability in the dialogue and lack of trust between them. The fragmentation in 
leadership of the autodefensas can be understood due to their different motivations and 
activities. As journalists have pointed out, “the autodefensas has been infiltrated by 
organized crime, and now they are filling the gap left by the previous criminal 
organization.”85 
C. ORGANIZATION, LOGISTICS, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT 
The autodefensas has been following a pattern since its foundation. First, 
organizers established a clandestine group that promoted the participation of more 
citizens. Second, they performed reconnaissance of the area, locating the position of 
members of organized crime, their movements, and the logistics chain. Third, they 
                                                 
83 Jazmin Ferreyra, “Detienen a Jose Manuel Mireles en Lazaro Cardenas [Jose Manuel Mireles 
arrested in Lazaro Cardenas],” WRADIO, June 27, 2014, 
http://www.wradio.com.mx/noticias/judicial/detienen-jose-manuel-mireles-en-lazaro-
cardenas/20140627/nota/2296409.aspx 
84 Dennis A. Garcia, “Autodefensas, con Signos de Fractura: Desconocen a Papa Pitufo como Vocero 
[Autodefensas, with signs of fracture: Papa Smurf is no longer known as spokesman],” accessed October 
22, 2014, http://www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2014/817082.html  
85 Charles Parkingson, “Nuevo Cartel en Michoacán Refuerza Temores por la Criminalización de las 
Autodefensas [New cartel in Michoacán reinforces fears about the criminalization of autodefensas],” 
InSightCrime, May 6, 2014, http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/nuevo-cartel-michoacan-refuerza-
temores-criminalizacion-autodefensas 
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established contacts with the nearby communities to emerge simultaneously and confront 
the criminals. 
For financial support, each organization finances its own activities, funded mainly 
by the local population. One documented case of financial support comes from 
Michoacán´s migrants to the United States of America, who have provided economic 
resources to the movement and whose actions have given a political projection for the 
movement.86 Moreover, according to Jose Mireles, part of the money used to support 
these autodefensas was usually paid to the cartel for protection—around 30 million pesos 
(280, 000 USD) in monthly payments.87 Currently, this money, plus the revenue from the 
lemon production that the Knights Templar abandoned, is going to support the 
autodefensas.88 
In terms of armaments, the autodefensas have considerable firepower; their 
armament varies from pistols to Barrett rifles, the cost of which hovers around 23,000 
pesos, or approximately 1,800 USD.89 It is also necessary to consider the ammunition for 
each armament, fuel for their vehicles, and food to sustain the operation. It is still unclear 
how this organization obtained the total amount of resources for its operation. 
The political program of the autodefensas was to formally end the oppression that 
the organized crime exerts in the state including: extortions, robbery, kidnapping, 
murders, production of drugs, and drug sales. It can be argued that their actions are 
equivalent to taking political control of their communities and replacing the government 
in security matters. In this regard, in a January 2014 poll, 53 percent of Mexicans felt that 
the autodefensas defended their communities better than the authorities did, and 57 
                                                 
86 Laura Sanchez Ley, “Migrantes en EU Financian Autodefensas [Migrants in U.S. funded 
autodefensas],” El Universal, February 2, 2014, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-
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87 Jose Cardenas, “Michoacán, un Estado de Guerra [Michoacán, a State of War],” Excelsior, 
November 21, 2013, http://www.excelsior.com.mx/opinion/jose-cardenas/2013/11/21/929807  
88 Ibid.  
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Weapons for Autodefensas],” El Universal, January 18, 2014, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-
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percent agreed that communities should form their own police.90 The public support for 
this movement is quite understandable due to the insecure conditions prevailing in the 
state. 
D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
In January 2014, one year after the emergence of the autodefensas, President Peña 
signed and published a decree that identified the national commission for the security and 
integral development of Michoacán state. In accordance with the national development 
plan (2012–2018), which one of its main objectives is “Mexico in Peace.”91 The principal 
objective is restoring the rule of law in the state. 
Also in January 2014, the federal government proposed an agreement with the 
leaders of the autodefensas, and signed an eight-point document.92 Miguel Angel Osorio 
Chong, secretario de gobernacion (Secretariat of Government), said that the measure was 
temporary and that autodefensas’ members who wanted to become law enforcement 
officers would have register with the Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional (Secretariat of the 
National Defense).93 The government’s decision to integrate the autodefensas into the 
Rural Police changed, instead of being part of that force the federal government created a 
hybrid organization called the Policia Rural Estatal (Rural Police State Force).  
Since that day, the government has been working with the newly created force. In 
January of 2014, a national poll observed that 53 percent of Mexicans were in favor of 
the autodefensas.94 In contrast, the Secretary of National Public Security states that 
homicides and extortion have increased between January and June 2014. What this 
                                                 
90 “Policia Comunitaria [Community Police],” Parametria, accessed August 25, 2014, 
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illustrates is that the autodefensas might not be contributing to improve security and have 
become a part of the problem. 
According to the portal news Excelsior in May 2014, a new cartel has emerged in 
Michoacán and is known as La Tercera Hermandad (the Third Brotherhood or H3).95 
Included in this group are members of the autodefensas, Knight Templars, and the Cartel 
de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (Jalisco’s Cartel New Generation). Apparently, this new 
organization is filling the gap led by the Knights Templars, and it is starting to control the 
state. At the end, the question will be: Is the H3 a new organization or the Knights 
Templars just are changing the name? 
E. WHY IS MICHOACÁN SO IMPORTANT? 
The geography of Michoacán provides the necessary conditions for the 
establishment of organized crime structures. There are four aspects to be considered here. 
First, the state shares a border with five other jurisdictions including Guerrero (south); 
Morelos, Estado de México, Queretaro, and Guanajuato (center); and Jalisco, Colima, 
and the Pacific Ocean (west). These borders allow access to the routes, either to the 
center of the country, or to the north in the drug-trafficking routes. Taking advantage of 
the highways, roads, and third order trails, organizations gain access to the 113 
municipalities and the railroads that specially connect to the northern part of the state.96 
In general, these infrastructures allow the trade and transportation of any raw material 
from the area to any part of the country; however, the communication routes inside the 
state are not well connected with the rural areas.  
Second, the weather conditions range from -2° C to more than 32 degrees Celsius 
(or from 28.4° to more than 90° Fahrenheit). These variations in temperature facilitate 
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growing anything from lemons to avocados, as well as marijuana and poppy production. 
People have been growing such plants in Michoacán since 1947.97  
Third, the Harbor of Lazaro Cardenas is the second most important port on the 
Pacific coast. Due to the intensification and diversification of its operations, any kind of 
merchandise can embark from this port to any Pacific coastline port.98 For example, in 
2012, the Port of Lazaro Cardenas moved 1,242,777 twenty-foot equivalent units 
(TEUs),99 up from 2005, when it only moved 132,479 TEU.100 In this regard, the import 
of chemical precursors from China for the production of methamphetamines has been one 
of the leading activities of organized crime in the state. Additionally, the 200 kilometers 
of coastline are propitious for drug smuggling at sea and transportation to the north.  
Finally, the mineral industry in the state obtains metals such as gold, silver, 
copper, iron, and lead, and 13 other non-metallic minerals. The most common metal 
mineral is iron, for which production has varied from 3,116,823 tons in 2008 to 
4,049,927 tons in 2012.101 Michoacán is the state that produces the most minerals in 
Mexico. The conditions previously described make Michoacán a fertile ground for both 
legal and illegal activities. The latter has led to criminal structures settling in the area 
where there are gaps in power between local and state authorities. 
F. CONCLUSION 
At this point, the autodefensas in Michoacán have emerged because of the 
absence of the state in certain regions, particularly in ungoverned spaces. Due to the 
inability of the state to provide adequate security, these groups flourish in such areas. 
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Under these insecure conditions, combined with the wealth of the state in natural and 
mineral resources, criminal actors find it ideal to appropriate the role of security provider. 
It is important to mention that the negative consequence of the violence generated by 
criminal organization is different from common violence.  
The emergence of this new cartel would be the fourth generation of criminals in 
Michoacán. It seems that the emergence of the Third Brotherhood (H3) has been 
produced by the fall of the empire of the Knights Templars. Now, the rules of the game 
will probably be the same; there will just be a change in the provider. 
Michoacán is immersed in the process of political reconfiguration and the 
acceptable use of violence, where different actors are playing the role of the state 
(autodefensas, municipal, state and federal authorities, and criminal organizations). In the 
region, there are multiple interests: political, economic, or social. The fact that the most 
useful political resource used by the autodefensas is violence is part of a long dynamic 




Mexico is not a failed state; however, in some parts of the country its security, 
political framework, and institution of justice have been coopted and corrupted. In 
addition, there has been a profound breakdown of the social order due to the presence of 
organized crime. An example of this is the particular case of Michoacán and the 
emergence of the autodefensas. A combination of factors has configured ungoverned 
spaces where a parallel system of governance has emerged. Just like common crime 
constitutes a threat to the population, drug trafficking is the main threat to the state.  
As seen in this thesis, the cause for the emergence of self-defense groups in 
Mexico, specifically in Michoacán, is the relation of power with different political actors, 
whether formal or informal, relations that provide incentives for violence. Therefore, 
different political parties involved in the transition of power contribute to the imbalance 
to the system, not in the sense that a change in power between political parties affects 
democracy, but in the context of the informal economies. Because of this quasi-
relationship, ungoverned spaces are configured where the state is no longer present, and 
when there is no legitimate monopoly on the use of physical violence, other groups 
(community-based or criminal organizations) may appropriate that role. Michoacán is the 
first documented case of a narco-state in the history of Mexico. 
First, winning the war on drugs is a never-ending process. Since the beginning of 
the Twentieth Century, the government has been using the same strategy—the direct 
approach using the military and police forces in ground and maritime interdiction and 
eradication, combined with the kingpin approach. Initially, the paradigm was imported 
from the United States and included a puritanical moral influence of prohibition; 
however, later it involved a symbiosis with a growing antinarcotics bureaucracy that was 
used as a form of unilateral pressure.  
To some extent, these strategies have yielded positive results and have prevented 
tons of drugs from reaching consumers. The consequences of the strategy to fight the 
major cartels, such as Golfo, Zetas, Familia Michoacana, Knights Templars, and others, 
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have led to the fragmentations formed by many cells beginning operating independently. 
Even these small organizations have become more violent because they have diversified 
activities, such as collecting illegal rents, street control, illegal extraction of 
hydrocarbons, and human trafficking.  
Second, the real cause of the emergence of ungoverned spaces in Mexico is most 
probably the corruption of the authorities.102 The historical and structural problems of the 
justice system, police forces, and government institutions are embedded in the state. 
Therefore, to deal with the configuration of ungoverned spaces, Mexico must reinforce 
the state and municipality institutions. As seen in Michoacán, what occurred was an 
enormous deterioration of the state institutions. Because of the intolerable situation, the 
Michoacán people organized to defend themselves from the criminal organizations. 
Third, it is important to have as fresh indirect approach to the war on drugs, one 
that strengthens consumption prevention, culture of legality, education, an efficient, 
effective, and reliable police structure, and a good judicial system. All of these activities 
must be implemented at the local level with a strong governmental presence. This 
presence need not be solely in terms of military and police forces, but also in the media, 
in schools, through the reclamation of public spaces in the communities, and through the 
promotion of employment programs.  
The results of these activities will ultimately be seen in the long term. Above all, 
it is imperative that coordination between different levels of governance be improved and 
reinforced; therefore, work efforts must be in the same positive direction. At least the first 
steps of a new approach need to be taken. Finally, Mexico should look to other countries, 
such as Portugal, to learn how to deal with drugs and corruption so that it can begin to 
balance the unequal forms in that the drugs problem is addressed in U.S. and Mexico. 
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